# Plan for Week 9: The Metaphysics of Intentionality

Sellars's strategy in *SM* to present *scientia mensura* scientific realism as a Kantian transcendental idealism. MI is phenomenal appearance and SI says what material things are in themselves.

# I. A Brief History of Conceptions of the Appearance/Reality Distinction

#### From *Resemblance* to *Representation*:

From Atomistic to Holistic Conceptions of Appearance/Reality

- 1. Resemblance (Plato, Aristotle, Scholastics).
- 2. The New Science (Galileo, Descartes) not intelligible as Resemblance.

#### Response:

- 3. *Representation* (Descartes, fully explicit in Kant). The model of Cartesian algebraic geometry.
- 4. Holistic Character of Representation (Spinoza out of Descartes).

# Two Structural-Categorial Models of Intentional Nexus of Representing and Represented

- A) Two Senses in which *Objects* (Particulars Referred to by *Terms*) *Exist*:
- 1. Formal vs. Objective Existence of Material Objects (Descartes out of Scholastics).
- 2. Simple Existence (Reality) vs.
  - Existence in Representings or as Represented or Representable (Appearance).
- 3. Sellars on Descartes and Kant on Appearance and Reality in Terms of Representation. "Appearances and Things in Themselves: Material Objects" *SM* Ch. II.
  - [Main Segment, via Passages.]
    The argument from illusion. McDowell's response.

#### Alternative Model:

4.

B) Thought as Inner Speech: Taking seriously the "the character by virtue of which [a representing] represents what it represents" (§3).

Fitting this into the history of the concept of representation:

Holism, Normativity, and Sentential Content.

### Why Declarative Sentences Matter.

- C) Two Senses in which *Thoughts* (Claimables-Judgeables, Expressed by *Sentences*) *Hold*: Two Forms Judgeable Contents Can Occur In.
- 1. Claimables-first Order of Explanation (Kant, Frege, Wittgenstein).
- 2. True vs. Taken-True, Fact vs. Attitude, Holds vs. Held.

## II. From Truth to Correspondence of Appearance with Reality

- 1. Truth and Reference a matter of Semantics: Metalinguistic Inferences, So Cannot be the Connection between Appearance and Reality.
- 2. Matter-of-Factual *Picturing*: of Constellations of Nonlinguistic Particulars by Constellations of Linguistic Particulars.